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Graeme Melcher* Hit Them Where it Hurts: State
Responses to Biker Gangs in Canada
From civil and criminal forfeiture, to "gangsterism" offences in the Criminal
Code, Canada does not lack for tools to address biker gangs. Yet attempts to
stamp out bikers have met with little to no success. State responses to criminal
organizations should use those organizations' own structures and symbols of
power against them. A gang's reputation may be effectively used against a gang,
but this strategy poses significant challenges to prosecution. Attempts to use
a gang's internal hierarchy and administrative structure can succeed, but may
only produce circumstantial findings if not supported by sufficient and substantial
evidence. Attempts to combat gang violence by targeting their clubhouses,
whether through forfeiture provisions or through municipal bylaws, may prove
the most effective methods of targeting biker gangs. The issue is not a lack of
resources; those resources are used inefficiently and ineffectively.
Quil s'agisse de confiscation civile et criminelle ou des infractions de
<< gangst~risme > prdvues dans le Code criminel, le Canada ne manque pas
de moyens pour lutter contre les gangs de motards. Pourtant, les tentatives
d'6radiquer les motards n'ont eu que peu ou pas de succ~s. L'Etat devrait
s'attaquer aux organisations criminelles en utilisant leurs propres structures et
symboles de pouvoir. La reputation d'un gang peut 6tre utilis~e efficacement
contre lui, mais cette strat~gie pose 6galement des ddfis importants pour
le poursuivant. Les tentatives d'utiliser la hidrarchie interne et la structure
administrative d'un gang peuvent rdussir, mais il est possible qu'elles ne
produisent que des conclusions circonstancielles si elles ne sont pas 6taydes par
une preuve suffisante et substantielle. Les tentatives de lutte contre la violence
des gangs en ciblant leurs repaires, que ce soit par la confiscation de leurs biens
ou par /'adoption de r~glements municipaux, peuvent s'avrer les m~thodes les
plus efficaces pour sattaquer aux gangs de motards. Le problme n'est pas un
manque de ressources; ces ressources sont utilisbes de manibre non efficiente
et non efficace.
* Graeme Melcher is an articling student with the Toronto office of Bennett Jones LLP, and
completed his Juris Doctor at the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie. Prior to law school, Graeme
completed his Master of Arts at York University under the supervision of Dr. Craig Heron. He would
like to thank Professor Steve Coughlan, Kate Icely, and Nick Hooper for their feedback and guidance,
his family and friends for their continued support, and the staff and volunteers at the Dalhousie Law
Journal for their comments and reviews.
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Introduction
From pirates prowling the Atlantic coast in the 18th century to bootleggers
running Canadian whiskey into prohibition-era America, organized crime
has existed in Canada for centuries. Bill C-95 was passed in 1997 and
introduced s. 467.1, the "gangsterism offence," to the Criminal Code,
which was substantially amended by Bill C-24 in 2001 .2 Canada's anti-
gang measures are not limited to strictly offence-based responses, and
other avenues of punishing bikers from procedural tools to forfeiture
provisions are also effective. This article focuses on the state's responses
1. Stephen Schneider, Iced: The Story of Organized Crime in Canada (Mississauga: John Wiley &
Sons Canada, 2009) at 8-12 [Schneider, Iced].
2. Bill C-95, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal organizations) and to amend otherActs
in consequence, 2nd Sess, 35thParl, 1997 [Bill C-95]; Bill C-24, An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(organized crime and law enforcement) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st
Sess, 37thParl, 2001 [Bill C-24].
State Reponses to Biker Gangs in Canada
to outlaw motorcycle gangs3 because Canada's current anti-gang laws
were enacted due to public outcry over the violence of the Quebec Biker
War of the 1990s and early 2000s.'
The state should focus its investigative and prosecutorial resources on
the elements of a gang that the state may most effectively use against it.
In the past, state efforts to prosecute gang members based on the gang's
reputation-the "power ofthe patch"-have produced mixed results, since
it requires the Crown to expend significant resources to prove the accused
wielded the gang's reputation in the commission of another offence.
Strategies that target or make use of a gang's administrative structures
and hierarchies-from the membership process to networking between
chapters and members-may be more successful provided the state does
not overreach in attempting to lay their charges. Finally, strategies that
target gang clubhouses and property may be the most effective methods
of combatting biker gangs. Evidence gathered through investigation of the
clubhouse and the opportunity to strike directly at bikers' presence in an
area can be powerful tools in prosecuting biker gangs. We do not lack for
tools to prosecute and investigate biker gangs in Canada, imperfect though
these tools may be. Rather than designing new laws, the state ought to
determine how to most effectively use a gang's resources against them.
1. The history of outlaw bikers in Canada
The outlaw biker identity was bom following a disastrous weekend
motorcycle rally in the town of Hollister, California in 1947. A few years
later, in the working-class San Francisco suburb of Oakland, several
outlaw bikers formed a new club. Their logo was a winged skull wearing
a motorcycle helmet, and they took their name from a World War Two
flying squadron: the Hells Angels.' In southern Ontario, the Satan's
Choice Motorcycle Club [the Choice] were formed in the early 1960s by
an amateur boxer named Bernie Guindon. 6 At the height of their power
3. For the purposes of this article, a motorcycle gang is any group that has been found in a court of
law to constitute a criminal organization, whereas a motorcycle club is any group, outlaw or otherwise,
that has not been so found.
4. Schneider, Iced, supra note 1 at 411-416; Karen Marie Katz, "Law Gone to Politics, Politics
Gone to Law: The Evolution of Canada's Organized Crime Legislation" (2011) 57:1 Crim LQ 58 at
82.
5. "The Founding of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club," Hells Angels World (website), online:
<https://hells-angels.com/our-club/history/> ["Hells Angels: History"].
6. Mick Lowe, Conspiracy of Brothers: A True Story of Murder Bikers and the Law (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 66-67 [Lowe, Conspiracy ofBrothers]; Don Norris, Riding With
Attitude: A Journey Through Life on a Motorcycle (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2005) at 57.
This was actually the second iteration of the Choice, the first having been forcibly shut down by a rival
club a few years earlier.
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in the late 1960s, the Choice had a dozen chapters from Windsor to
Thunder Bay to Ottawa. No other Canadian club could match the Choice
for membership, territory, or power, and internationally they were second
only to the Hells Angels.' Though many of these early outlaw bikers held
down steady day jobs, others would supplement their income by collecting
debts, acting as hired muscle, or selling drugs.' These activities were not
club-wide ventures, but instead consisted of individual members engaging
in individual crimes. 9 When Guindon was arrested in 1976 for his role
in "the largest [PCP manufacturing operation] in North America,"o there
was no evidence to suggest that he had used his association with the
Choice in the commission of the crime. Guindon had relied on his personal
reputation and capacity for violence, rather than the reputation or power of
the Choice, to commit his criminal activities."
The Hells Angels attempted to assimilate the Choice and establish a
Canadian presence in 1968, but the Angels' emissary was rebuffed before
he even left the Toronto airport. Guindon, at the time the Choice's national
president, was fiercely Canadian, and refused to see the Choice reduced
to a branch of an American organization.1 2 A little less than a decade later
Garnet McEwan, Guindon's replacement as the Choice's national president,
was much more willing to work with American clubs. The Choice began to
splinter under McEwan, and in the summer of 1977 the Choice split: half
the chapters remained Choice and the other half joined the Outlaws, an
American outlaw motorcycle club and the Hells Angels' greatest rivals.13
Both American clubs had been eyeing a Canadian expansion, and the fact
that the Outlaws had set up shop in Ontario's lucrative southwest forced the
Hells Angels to act. On 5 December 1977, Montreal's fearsome Popeyes
motorcycle club were assimilated by the Hells Angels and became the
gang's first Canadian chapter." From their beachhead in Montreal, the
7. Lowe, Conspiracy ofBrothers, supra note 6 at 77, 93, 118.
8. R v Guindon, [1980] OJ No 494 (QL) at para 4 (ON CA) [Guindon]; Lowe, Conspiracy of
Brothers, supra note 6 at 3, 7, 13; Graeme Melcher, "Rebellion on the Road: Masculinity and Outlaw
Motorcycle Clubs in Postwar Ontario," in Peter Gossage & Robert Rutherdale, eds, Making Men,
Making History: Canadian Masculinities across Time and Place (Toronto: UBC Press, 2018) 364 at
374 [Melcher, "Rebellion on the Road"].
9. Lowe, Conspiracy ofBrothers, supra note 6 at 106; Interview of Stuart Henderson (21 December
2011) onbikers in Toronto's Yorkville Community (unpublished); Reginald G Smart& David Jackson,
"Yorkville Subculture" in WE Mann,ed, The Underside of Thronto (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1970) 109 at 117.
10. Guindon, supra note 8 at para 3.
11. Guindon, ibid; R v Patterson, Valois, and Guindon, 31 CCC (2d) 352 (ON District Court).
12. Lowe, Conspiracy ofBrothers, supra note 6 at 118.
13. Melcher, "Rebellion on the Road," supra note 8 at 72-75; R v Lindsay, 2005 CanLII 24240 (ON
Sup Ct), [2005] OJ No 2870 (QL) at para 653 [Lindsay].
14. Melcher, "Rebellion on the Road," ibid at 71-75; Lindsay, ibid at paras 331, 398, 653.
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Hells Angels expanded across the country. This expansion was driven
in large part by the Canadian Hells Angels' national president Walter
Stadnick, who wanted to see the Hells Angels rule as Canada's largest
and most powerful outlaw motorcycle club." Stadnick succeeded: on 29
December 2000, virtually all of Ontario's outlaw bikers were assimilated
by the Hells Angels, making the gang the largest and most powerful biker
gang in the country.1 6 Canada is Hells Angels territory, and from coast to
coast and around the world, they all trade on a shared brand and reputation.
2. The Quebec biker war
Outlaw motorcycle clubs were largely ignored by the state and the public
at large for decades because they tended to confine their crime and
violence to the criminal underworld, with little crossover into everyday
society." Though Montreal's criminals had traditionally shared the drug
trade, by 1994 the Hells Angels controlled 80% of the market thanks to
their overwhelming membership numbers and capacity for violence, their
national organization, and their control over key shipping ports." As a
result, the greatest resistance to the Hells Angels' expansion came not
from the state or from concerned residents, but from other criminals. In
the late 1980s a group of drug dealers and criminals in Montreal formed
a group called the Rock Machine to counter the Hells Angels' dominance
over the city's lucrative drug market.1 9 Unsurprisingly, the Hells Angels
resented the challenge to their monopoly, and in the early 1990s they set
about attempting to wipe out the Rock Machine in what became known as
the Quebec Biker War.20
Public apathy towards the bikers vanished with the death of 11-
year old Daniel Desrochers in the summer of 1995. Desrochers was
the innocent victim of a Hells Angels hit on a suspected Rock Machine
associate. 2 1 Canadians, and Montreal residents in particular, realized that
biker violence was no longer confined to the criminal underworld and that
15. R v Stadnick, 2004 CanLIl 2116, [2004] QJ No 7163 (QL) at paras 76, 83, 97-98 (CS QC)
[Stadnick].
16. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 331, 351, 575, 679, 1060; Adrian Humphreys, "Hells Angels
Under Pressure," National Post (5 June 2015), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/hells-angels-in-
canada> [Humphreys, "Hells Angels Under Pressure"].
17. Schneider, Iced, supra note 1 at 434-436.
18. Karen Marie Katz, Gangsterism: Canada's Law of Criminal Organizations (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters Canada, 2013) at 27-33 [Katz, Gangsterism]; Canada, House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The State of Organized Crime, (March 2012) (Chair: Dave
MacKenzie, MP) at 9-10 [Standing Committee, The State of Organized Crime].
19. Schneider, Iced, supra note 1 at 408-410.
20. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 27-29.
21. Katz, Gangsterism, ibid at 31-33; Julian Sher & Williams Marsden, The Road to Hell: How the
Biker Gangs are Conquering Canada (Toronto: Vintage Canada 2004) at 20-22.
613
614 The Dalhousie Law Journal
everyday citizens had reason to fear for their safety. Quebec politicians and
police leaders began petitioning the federal government the day after the
bombing, demanding new and harsh criminal law sanctions to put a stop
to the biker violence.2 2 Faced with mounting anger over gang violence,
the Liberal government gave in to public pressure and introduced the first
version of the gangsterism offence.2 3
3. Bill C-95
On 21 April 1997-seven days before calling a national election-
the Liberal government introduced Bill C-95. Despite containing over 50
pages of Criminal Code amendments and provisions, it received virtually
no comments or opposition. 24 The centrepiece of the legislation was the new
gangsterism offence, s. 467.1 of the Criminal Code. Section 467.1 made
it an offence to participate in, or substantially contribute to, the activities
of a criminal organization, or to be party to the commission of an offence
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
organization. Those convicted of gangsterism could be sentenced to a
term of up to 14 years' imprisonment. 25 Gangsterism was an enhancement
offence: rather than criminalizing a new action, it added further criminal
law sanctions for the circumstances surrounding the commission of an
initial offence. A criminal organization was defined as any group of five
or more individuals that had as one of its primary goals the commission
of an indictable offence punishable by at least five years' imprisonment,
and the members of the organization must have engaged in a series of such
offences within the previous five years. 2 6 This became known as the 5-5-
5 rule: five members, five years' imprisonment, and a series of offences
committed within the preceding five years. 2 7 Bill C-95 also introduced s.
490.1 to the Criminal Code, which allowed the state to seize "offence-
related property" from an accused following their conviction for a criminal
organization offence. Section 490.1 generally mirrored a similar provision
included in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act [CDSA] that had
been introduced a year earlier.28
22. Katz, Gangsterism, ibid at 34-35.
23. Don Stuart, "Politically Expedient But Potentially Unjust Legislation against Gangs," (1997) 2
Can Crim L Rev 207 at 200.
24. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 42-45; Bill C-95, supra note 2.
25. Ibid at s 11.
26. Bill C-95, supra note 2 at s 1.
27. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 55.
28. Bill C-95, supra note 2 at s 15; Bill C-8, An Act respecting the control of certain drugs, their
precursors and other substances and to amend certain other Acts and Repeal the Narcotic Control
Act in consequence thereof 2nd Sess, 35th Parl, 1997; Bill C-24, supra note 2. For simplicity, and
because both forfeiture provisions function in largely the same manner, both of these provisions may
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Bill C-95 was an example of the criminalization of politics.2 9
Discussion of, and attempts to address, overarching issues of social and
economic justice were set aside in favour of the creation of new offences
and the imposition of more severe punishments for existing offences.
such that the state began to rely more heavily on criminal law measures
to address societal ills. Bill C-95 was designed and enacted to shore up
public support for the Liberal government rather than to pursue legitimate
criminal law goals of public safety and order.3 0 Unfortunately, as a
reactionary measure it lacked the refinement and contemplation necessary
to produce an effective long-term response. A more substantial solution
to the problem of biker gang violence was required. The ink of Bill C-95
was barely dry before the new gangsterism offence's shortcomings were
brought into sharp relief: the Hells Angels murdered two prison guards in
June and September of 1997.31
4. Bill C-24
The continuing violence of the biker war was brought to a head with the
attempted murder of journalist Michel Auger on 13 September 2000, the
day before his expose on biker gangs in Montreal was published. A few
weeks later, Francois Laforest, a bar owner who refused to allow Hells
Angels drug dealers to sell in his bar, was beaten to death in broad daylight.3 2
In the face of public outrage not seen since the death of Desrochers a few
years earlier, the Liberals quickly redrafted the gangsterism laws, and Bill
C-24 was passed on 18 December 2001. Much like C-95, Bill C-24 was
fast tracked through Parliament with virtually no opposition or substantial
analysis, "in the dying days of Parliament against a back-drop of media-
fuelled hysteria over biker related violence in Quebec."3 3
Amendments to the gangsterism offence were at the heart of the
new legislation. A criminal organization was now defined as any group,
however organized, that consisted of three or more persons within or
outside of Canada, and that had as one of its main purposes or activities
the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences likely to
result in direct or indirect benefit to the group or to any of the persons
be referred to as "criminal forfeiture." The Criminal Code forfeiture provision was expanded under
Bill C-24 in 2001, but it was originally expressly aimed at bikers.
29. Kent Roach, "The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism" in
Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The Security ofFreedom: Essays on Canada &
Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 131 at 138.
30. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 45-48.
31. Ibidat39-41.
32. Ibid at 73-74.
33. Ibid at 79-82. Bill C-24 came into force on7 January 2002.
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constituting the group.34 The single gangsterism offence was replaced with
three separate offences. Section 467.11, the "facilitation" offence, made
it an indictable offence to knowingly participate in or contribute to any
activity of a criminal organization to enhance the organization's ability
to facilitate or commit an indictable offence. Individuals convicted under
s. 467.11 may be sentenced to a maximum of five years' imprisonment.3 5
Section 467.12, the "association" offence, made it an indictable offence to
commit an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal organization. An individual convicted under s.
467.12 may be sentenced to a maximum term of 14 years' imprisonment. 3 6
Section 467.13, the "instruction" offence, made it an indictable offence
to knowingly instruct, directly or indirectly, any person to commit an
offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the
organization. An individual convicted under s. 467.13 may be sentenced
to a maximum term of life imprisonment. 37
I. The power of the patch
In the words of anthropologist Daniel Wolf, a biker's reputation for
violence, and the fear and intimidation he wields, "is a marketable
commodity." 38 Bikers are unusual as criminal organizations: rather than
hide their affiliation from public eye, they proudly display their gang
or club's name, identity, and territorial affiliation, as well as their own
membership in that group, in their "colours." A biker's colours consist
of three main parts: a top "rocker" patch with the group's name, a lower
"rocker" patch with the wearer's territorial affiliation, and the club's logo
in the center. Only full members of an organization may wear the complete
three-piece set of patches, leading to these members being known as
"full patch members." 39 When a biker wears his colours, the power and
reputation of the club or gang become part of the biker's "personal force,"
augmenting his individual reputation and capacities with that of the gang. 40
34. Bill C-24, supra note 2 at s 27; Canadian Bar Association, Submission on Bill C-24: Criminal
Code Amendments (Organized Crime and Law Enforcement) (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,
2001) at 2.
35. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 111-113; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 467.11
[Criminal Code].
36. Katz, Gangsterism, ibid at 116-119; Criminal Code, ibid at s 467.12.
37. Katz, Gangsterism, ibid at 124-128; Criminal Code, ibid at s 467.13.
38. Daniel Wolf, The Rebels: A Brotherhood of Outlaw Bikers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1991) at 266 [Wolf, The Rebels].
39. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 235, 267, 541. Prospective members, known as prospects or
strikers, wear variations of these colours demonstrating that they are associated with, but not yet full
members of, the group.
40. Lindsay, ibid at para 241.
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The power of the patch is the ability to create "fear and insecurity without
saying a word.""
The Hells Angels are extremely protective of their name and logo, and
both are officially registered to the Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation
[HAMC], a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of
California.4 2 In order to protect their recognizable brand power, they do
not sell any items to the general public that bear the gang's name or logo.
Full members may use or possess items with the Hells Angels name and/or
logo, but are required to sign agreements stating that any item bearing the
name or logo of the gang is owned by the HAMC.4 3 The Hells Angels and
the HAMC have brought several cases for trademark infringement against
such diverse parties as Toys "R" Us, fashion house Alexander McQueen,
and Walt Disney Studios." They also protect their intellectual property
through more direct measures: with regard to the Hells Angels name and
logo, the Hells Angels New York City chapter's website warns "should
we find you using any of these we will hunt you down and hurt you.""
All of this results in one assumption that may be relied upon as entirely
accurate: if you see an individual wearing Hells Angels colours, or wearing
something with the Hells Angels' name or bearing their distinctive logo,
that individual is a full member of the Hells Angels. The power of the
patch is a tremendous asset to the Hells Angels, as it conveys a degree of
criminality and a willingness to resort to violence without requiring the
member to actually commit a criminal act or utter any threat.4 6 However, it
is possible to turn this strength back on the gang, and to use the power of
the patch in the prosecution of gang members charged with the association
offence under s. 467.12.
1. Using the power of the patch in furtherance ofa crime
Section 467.12 is unique among the current gangsterism offences: unlike
the other offences, it does not "create or expand liability" for otherwise
non-criminal conduct, but instead acts to aggravate or enhance an
accused's liability for an indictable offence committed for a criminal
organization. The Crown must first prove that the accused committed
41. Ibid at para 1021.
42. Rv HellsAngelsMotorcycle Corporation, 2009 CanLII 53152 at para 3, 246 CCC (3d) 559 (ON
SC) [Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation].
43. Ibid at paras 21-22.
44. Serge F Kovaleski, "Despite Outlaw Image, Hells Angels Sue Often," The New York Times
(28 November 2013), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/us/despite-outlaw-image-hells-
angels-sue-often.html>.
45. Hells Angels New York City Chapter, "Hells Angels Presents New York City," Big RedMachine,
online: <http://bigredmachine.com/>.
46. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 241, 1021; R vMyles, 2012 ONSC 6772 at para 27 [Myles].
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an "initial offence." Then, the Crown must prove some connection
between the offence itself and the criminal organization such that it was
committed at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with the
organization." The association offence functions as an additional, "tacked
on" offence, like a simplified version of the original gangsterism offence.
It cannot be charged on its own, and its successful prosecution depends
not only on proving the essential elements of the association offence, but
also of proving the initial underlying offence. If the accused is acquitted of
the underlying offence, they must be acquitted of the association offence
regardless of the evidence that they may have acted for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.
The first and most substantial case to use the association offence
against the Hells Angels was R. v. Lindsay, a 2005 case against Steven
Lindsay and Raymond Bonner, two members of the Hells Angels'
Woodbridge, Ontario chapter. Both men were charged with extortion, and
with committing extortion in association with a criminal organization, the
Hells Angels. The Crown alleged that Lindsay and Bonner had threatened
Mr. M., and ordered him to pay them a sum of $75,000. They visited Mr.
M. at his home where they threatened to send "people" to "pound the
hell" out of him, and told him that the $75,000 was owed to Lindsay and
to five other men "that are fucking the same kind of mother fuck as I am."
Crucially, Lindsay and Bonner wore clothing and paraphernalia, including
jackets, t-shirts, boots, and belt buckles, that bore the Hells Angels name
and logo while threatening Mr. M."
The initial offence of extortion was made out relatively easily against
both defendants.4 9 In contrast, the gangsterism offence proved significantly
more complex, both in terms of the amount of evidence required to make
out the offence and the amount of time and resources expended in pursuit
of the conviction."o Justice Fuerst ultimately found that the Hells Angels
constituted a criminal organization: they were a group composed of
three or more individuals, and that they had as one of their primary goals
the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if
successful, would likely result in direct or indirect benefit to its members."
Both men "deliberately invoked their membership" in the Hells Angels to
47. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 116-119.
48. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 1-7, 28-43, 86-87, 89-91.
49. Ibid at para 185.
50. The length and content allocation of Justice Fuerst's judgement reflects this difference: of her
1,091-paragraph judgement, approximately 880 paragraphs are dedicated to the gangsterism offence,
whereas the extortion offence is dealt with in 70 paragraphs. Standing Committee, The State of
Organized Crime, supra note 18 at 36; Lindsay, supra note 13.
51. Criminal Code, supra note 35, ss 467.1, 467.12(1); Lindsay, ibid at paras 945, 1090.
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intimidate Mr. M. in committing their extortion, and therefore intended
to commit the extortion in association with the Hells Angels as a criminal
organization.52 The Crown succeeded in Lindsay because they were able
to connect the accused's actions and knowledge directly to their intention
to use the Hells Angels' reputation to extort Mr. M.53 Lindsay's threats to
send men to M.'s home to "pound the hell" out of him, or the warning that
the money belonged to Lindsay and five other men "that are fucking the
same kind of mother fuck as I am" were intimidating enough on their own.
However, these statements were made even more intimidating, thereby
enhancing the extortion, because Lindsay uttered them while wearing
the Hells Angels name and logo. By adding the Hells Angels' power to
his own personal force, Lindsay's threats of harm and punishment took
on graver and more serious meaning, but they also implicated the Hells
Angels as an organization in the extortion of Mr. M.
In contrast, the proceedings in R. v. Giles demonstrate an ineffective
application of the association offence and the risks of overreaching when
prosecuting gangsterism offences. Giles saw three accused-David Giles,
David Revell and Richard Rempel-charged with possession of cocaine
for the purposes of trafficking, and having committed that offence for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.
Giles was a full-patch member of the Hells Angels' Vancouver East End
chapter, and the Crown alleged that the association charges against all three
were made out by Giles' involvement in a cocaine trafficking operation
operated by Revell and Rempel, neither of whom had any Hells Angels
status."4 As there was no evidence directly linking Giles to the cocaine, the
Crown instead argued that he had knowledge of the cocaine and exercised
control over it by directing and authorizing Revell's drug trafficking in his
capacity as a member of the Hells Angels." Justice Mackenzie acquitted
Giles of the trafficking offence, stating that there was no evidence of his
direct possession, knowledge, or control of the cocaine, and little evidence
as tojoint or constructive possession.56 The Crown was only able to produce
circumstantial evidence linking Giles' status as a Hells Angels member to
the commission of the offence." Justice Mackenzie found that the Crown
failed to link Giles to the trafficking, and had failed to link Giles and his
52. Lindsay, ibidatparas 1090-1091.
53. Ibid at para 1088.
54. Rv Giles, 2008 BCSC 367 at paras 1-3, 10, [2007] BCJ No 2918 (QL) [Giles].
55. Ibid at paras 133-141.
56. Ibid at paras 143, 159-194, 200-208.
57. Ibid at paras 233-238.
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status as a Hells Angels member to the trafficking operation." Unlike the
proceedings in Lindsay, there was little evidence linking Giles and his
membership in the Hells Angels to the cocaine trafficking.
Lindsay and Giles demonstrate different attempts to prove that
individuals wielded or used their status as members of the Hells Angels
in the commission of offences. Lindsay succeeded because it was a
comparatively straightforward matter: simple extortion, augmented by
Lindsay and Bonner's decision to invoke their membership in the Hells
Angels to further intimidate Mr. M. Lindsay and Bonner proudly announced
their status as members of the Hells Angels through their clothing and
other accessories; in doing so, they invoked fear and promised that they
would make good on their threats by displaying and referencing their
membership in the Hells Angels in the commission of their offence. In
contrast, the Crown in Giles failed to prove a gangsterism offence because
there was insufficient direct evidence linking Giles to either the cocaine
trafficking or invoking the Hells Angels in his dealings with Revell and
Rempel, and only circumstantial evidence as to Giles' attempts to invoke
his gang membership in the trafficking. Prosecution based on the power of
the patch cannot be applied to all Hells Angels members and their alleged
offences, but must instead be used only when there is sufficient specific
evidence to support the charge.
2. Active vs. passive association with a criminal organization
On appeal, Lindsay and Bonner argued that they had not worn their Hells
Angels clothing with the intention of using it to intimidate Mr. M. or in
any other way further their extortion. Instead, they argued that they simply
wore their "ordinary attire," which just happened to bear the Hells Angels'
name and logo, when they extorted Mr. M. The Ontario Court of Appeal
soundly rejected this argument: "Put bluntly, [Justice Fuerst's] reasoning
on this issue was impeccable and her conclusion is the antithesis of
unreasonableness."5 9 Despite this finding, Lindsay still raises the questions
of how and to what extent an individual may associate their crime with a
criminal organization. Lindsay suggests that a more "passive" association
is possible. Justice Fuerst found that the Hells Angels' notoriety meant
that this passive invocation sufficiently associated the gang with the act of
extortion, as Lindsay and Bonner chose to portray themselves to Mr. M.
"not as individuals, but as members of a group with a reputation for violence
and intimidation... [they] were each well aware of the implications of their
58. Giles, supra note 54 at paras 196-197, 212-216.
59. Rv Lindsay, 2009 ONCA 532 atparas 34-37, 245 CCC (3d) 301.
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choice of attire."6 0 Lindsay and Bonner didn't have to say they were Hells
Angels; the fact that they were wearing the gang's highly-protected name
and logo spoke volumes on its own. This also seems to be in keeping with
the language of the law itself, as the Crown does not have to prove that an
individual charged under section 467.12(1) intended to commit their crime
in association with a criminal organization, merely that they did commit
an offence in association with a criminal organization.
The Hells Angels' notoriety meant that it was easier for Lindsay and
Bonner to passively invoke the gang's reputation, but such a passive
invocation would not be possible if the accused had been members of
a smaller, less well-known gang. An accused's intention to invoke gang
membership in the commission of a crime takes place on a continuum,
influenced by the gang's notoriety and the lengths to which an individual
may have gone to invoke the gang in the commission of an offence. It
seems likely that the more notorious and well-known a gang is, the easier
it may be to invoke their name and reputation in the commission of an
offence, allowing the court to consider a wider range of actions and factors
that might lead to invocation, either actively or passively, of the gang's
name and reputation. This suggests that the issue of active or passive
invocation, like many other elements of a gangsterism offence, must be
assessed contextually in relation to the elements of a specific offence, and
that broad rigid rules are not conducive to the effective and responsible
prosecution of gangsterism offences.
The issue of active or passive association with a criminal organization
is far from settled, and subsequent proceedings have raised further
questions as to the nature of association. In R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle
Corporation, Justice Pardu found that property or items bearing the
Hells Angels' name or logo were inherently intended to be used in the
commission of serious offences: 6 1
The use of these items is intended to further the organizational purposes.
It is to be used to intimidate and extort, and to serve as a badge of
trustworthiness in the conduct of drug deals. It matters not, that at the
precise moment of the extortion, the trademark is not displayed, or that
the person actually handling drugs does not wear the item [emphasis
added].
Given Justice Fuerst's emphasis in Lindsay on the accused wielding the
reputation of the Hells Angels as a tool in the commission of their offence,
60. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 1084-1085.
61. Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation, supra note 42 at paras 23-24.
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Justice Pardu's comments suggest that a gang member may benefit from
their gang's reputation without intending to do so. Justice Pardu's use of
the emphasized phrase suggests that, all other factors being equal, the
accused in Lindsay would have been equally guilty of their gangsterism
offence had they not worn any Hells Angels clothing when interacting
with Mr. M. The mere fact of their membership would be sufficient on its
own to support a gangsterism charge.
3. Contextual factors
In some instances, an accused may be unable to use the power of the
patch in the commission of their offence(s), regardless of their intention
to do so. Such an instance occurred in the proceedings of R. v. Myles,
a criminal forfeiture case brought following the convictions of several
members of the Hells Angels' Downtown Toronto chapter for various drug
trafficking offences, but the acquittal on all gangsterism offences.6 2 The
Crown sought to seize personal property owned by the accused that bore
the Hells Angels' name or logo on the basis that the articles symbolized
the accused's membership in the Hells Angels, and that membership in the
Hells Angels was beneficial to drug dealers.6 3 The forfeiture application
was brought under s. 16 of the CDSA, which allows the Crown to seize an
accused's property through one of two mechanisms: 64
1. If a person is convicted, and the Court is satisfied, on a balance of
probabilities, that any property is offence-related property, and that the
offence was committed in relation to that property, the Court shall order
forfeiture of the property; and
2. If the evidence does not establish that the offence of which the
person has been convicted was committed in relation to the property,
but the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is
"offence-related property" the Court may make an order for forfeiture of
the property [emphasis in original text, citations omitted].
Offence-related property is defined as any property: 65
(a) by means or in respect of which a designated substance offence is
committed;
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of a
designated substance offence; or
62. Myles, supra note 46 at paras 7-9; Peter Edwards, "Hells Angels beat organized crime
charges after marathon trial," The Toronto Star (23 May 2011), online: <https://www.thestar.com/
news/crime/20 11/05/2 3/hells angels beat organizedcrimecharges after marathon trial.html>
[Edwards, "Hells Angels beat organized crime charges after marathon trial"].
63. Myles, ibid at para 20.
64. Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation, supra note 42 at paras 4-5.
65. Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19, s 2.
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(c) that is intended to be used for committing a designated substance
offence.
Justice Forestell found that membership in the Hells Angels generally
provided individual members with access to a criminal network of
"trustworthy" drug vendors who were less likely to cooperate with the
police or to cheat on a drug deal. Membership in the Hells Angels acted
as a guarantor of quality and "trustworthiness" to potential clients, as the
Hells Angels have a rule against "ripping off' drug buyers and a reputation
for refusing to cooperate with police investigations.6 6 However, she also
found that the accused's personal property did not constitute offence-
related property. Though membership in the Hells Angels generally
helped drug dealers, it played no part in the trafficking that was the subject
matter of the criminal offences in Myles, and therefore the trafficking
offences had not been committed in relation to the property. Membership
in the Hells Angels was used to commit offences, but symbols of that
membership were not. Because all of the accused had been acquitted of
the gangsterism offences, evidence as to the Hells Angels' criminality in
general did directly benefit the state's application to seize the property, as
it failed to conclusively link the accused and their symbols of membership
to the trafficking offences.6 7 There was no evidence that a symbol of gang
membership was used or intended to be used in the commission of an
offence, although the property in question could have been used to that
effect.6 8 Because the accused in Myles all knew each other to be members
of a criminal organization, symbols of their membership in that gang were
irrelevant; there was no power in the patch. Each individual knew the
others to be members of the Hells Angels, and they relied on this firsthand
knowledge to deal comfortably with one another, secure in the criminal
"trustworthiness" of their fellow Hells Angels.
The outcome of Myles may be contrasted with the outcome of Hells
Angels Motorcycle Corporation. Whereas the accused in Myles were
convicted of trafficking offences and acquitted of their gangsterism
offences, the accused in Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation were
convicted of both trafficking and gangsterism offences.6 9 Hells Angels
Motorcycle Corporation involved the state's application to seize personal
property similar to that sought under Myles: jewelry, clothing, and
66. Myles, supra note 46 at paras 13, 24-27.
67. Ibid at paras 34-35. The fact that the property in question (shirts, calendars, and jewelry) also had
legitimate non-criminal purposes further weakened the state's arguments that it was offence-related.
68. Ibid at paras 42-43.
69. R v Ward, 81 WCB (2d) 767 (ON SC) at para 98 [Ward]; HellsAngels Motorcycle Corporation,
supra note 42 at paras 1-2.
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accessories, all bearing the Hells Angels' name or logo. Because of the
successful conviction for gangsterism in the preceding trials, Justice Pardu
was able to rely on evidence as to the Hells Angels' general criminality
in granting the state's forfeiture application in Hells Angels Motorcycle
Corporation." The articles and symbols of membership were intended
to be used to commit indictable offences in furtherance of the gang's
purposes, and were therefore offence-related property in connection
to the gangsterism offences." As the accused had all been convicted of
gangsterism, symbols of gang membership constituted elements of the
indictable offence of gangsterism.72 By securing gangsterism convictions
against the accused, the state could rely on evidence of the Hells Angels'
general criminality, rather than having to link the symbols of membership
directly to the commission of trafficking offences to justify their forfeiture.
4. Conclusion on the power of the patch
As Justice Fuerst observed in Lindsay, "the definition of 'criminal
organization' does not require.. .that facilitation of a serious offence be
the group's only 'main' purpose or activity. It must simply be 'one of 'its
main purposes or activities [emphasis added]."7 Lindsay demonstrated
how gangsterism proceedings may secure convictions against individual
members, but the need to base each proceeding in the circumstances
particular to that matter poses a significant challenge to their prosecution.
Establishing a group's criminality may be simple enough, but linking
the accused and the commission of offences to their membership in that
organization may be challenging.
II. Administrative structures and gang hierarchy
Despite their renegade reputation, the Hells Angels all share a recognizable
and consistent administrative structure. The gang is composed of chapters
which control or operate within specific territories or regions. These regions
may be small or large: the city of Toronto hosts at least two Hells Angels
chapters, whereas there appears to be only one chapter in the entire province
of Manitoba." The gang may expand their territory either by establishing
70. Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation, supra note 42 at para 20.
71. Ibid at paras 23-24.
72. Ibid at para 24.
73. Lindsay, supra note 13 at para 950.
74. Humphreys, "Hells Angels Under Pressure," supra note 16; "Hells Angels East Toronto
Canada," Hells Angels East Toronto, online: <http://hweb.archive.org/web/20171016071806/http://
hellsangelseasttoronto.com/> [Hells Angels East Toronto website]; Peter Edwards, "'Huge trend
toward renting' for GTA outlaw bikers, says cop," The Toronto Star (4 January 2016), online: <https://
www.thestar.com/news/crime/2016/01/04/huge-trend-toward-renting-for-gta-outlaw-bikers-says-cop.
html> [Edwards, "Huge trend toward renting"].
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a new chapter in a region, or by assimilating an existing club, a decision
which must be unanimously supported by the rest of the Hells Angels in
the area." Individuals may join the Hells Angels by graduating through
their membership process: from friend of the gang, to "hangaround," to
prospect, and then to full member. Prospects are extensively investigated
by their home chapter, and must visit other chapters provincially and be
unanimously approved by their home chapter before they can become full
members. New members may not transfer chapters within their first year
of membership, and after that may only transfer by agreement of their
home and new chapter. All of these procedures are designed to weed out
potential undercover police officers and ensure the individual is criminally
"trustworthy."76
Each chapter must maintain several executive positions-such as
president and treasurer-who are responsible for overseeing the chapter's
operations, and participating in provincial and national meetings." Some
chapters may maintain one or more support clubs, also called puppet clubs,
which are made up of individuals who wish to become Hells Angels.
These puppet clubs serve at the direction of the Hells Angels chapter or
individual members, and may be used for anything from providing security
at events to establishing a Hells Angels-related presence in new territory
to committing offences at the direction of chapter members." There is
also evidence of communication, collaboration, and cooperation between
chapters provincially and nationally.7 9 This strict and shared organizational
structure and communication is a tremendous asset to the Hells Angels. The
lengthy membership process and high level of communication between
chapters allows the gang to weed out potential undercover operatives or
individuals who may have previously crossed the gang in another region.
Similarly, the use of executive positions within chapters creates an internal
hierarchy and allows senior members to control subordinates. The shared
administrative order gives the gang a formalized structure and a high
degree of conformity, allows the gang to operate together effectively, and
reinforces the above-stated power of the patch by ensuring that the gang
presents a single unified public image.
75. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 331, 953-963.
76. Ward, supra note 69 at para 59; Lindsay, ibid at paras 964-972.
77. Lindsay, ibid at paras 973-976.
78. Ibid at paras 990-997.
79. This involvement runs from simple communication to sophisticated collaboration: Quebec Hells
Angels helped run drug trafficking operations in Ontario and Manitoba, phone and contact information
for all Canadian Hells Angels was shared among all national chapters, members will often visit and
party with other chapters, and every Canadian Hells Angels chapter contributes to a national fund used
to offset legal costs; Ibid at paras 998-1009.
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1. Officers and shared structures
Stadnick took aim at the Canadian Hells Angels' chief architect Walter
Stadnick. Stadnick was charged with a host of offences including
conspiracy to commit multiple murders, drug trafficking, and one count of
gangsterism in respect of each of those offences.so The Crown conceded
at trial that there was no evidence directly linking Stadnick to the majority
of the murders, but argued that Stadnick was a party to the offences
because he aided and/or abetted the commission of the offences, or that
the offences were a continuation of the common purpose: that Stadnick
and his fellow Nomads instructed their subordinates to secure territory
and shore up the gang's power by killing the competition, and that this
supported a finding of murder against Stadnick." In essence, the Crown
argued that Stadnick must have been involved in these murders strictly
because he was the national president of the Hells Angels and a prominent
member of the notorious Quebec Nomads chapter. Though Stadnick was
ultimately convicted of several offences, he was acquitted of many of the
offences due to insufficient direct evidence linking the Nomads en masse,
and membership therein, to the murders.82
The Crown successfully demonstrated that Stadnick had used his
position as the national president to influence and control other Canadian
Hells Angels in the commission of a trafficking offence, and that he had
been party to a conspiracy to commit murders. However, the Crown's
arguments that he was liable for subsequent murders purely because of
his status failed because of a lack of evidence specifically connecting him
to those particular offences. The Hells Angels' administrative structure
is undoubtedly a powerful tool for the gang, and it may be effectively
commandeered by the Crown in prosecuting Hells Angels members. This
structure on its own, no matter how well supported by expert testimony, is
not a substitute for direct evidence of involvement in criminal activities,
and will only support the Crown's claims as far as may be corroborated by
independent evidence of criminality. Such claims may be possible in the
future if there was sufficient evidence linking membership in a criminal
organization's elite or executive directly to that gang's criminality, even
if the individual accused did not direct or facilitate the commission of
criminal offences.
80. Stadnick, supra note 15 atparas 1-3, 194-196. The proceedings were simplified somewhat by his
admission that the Canadian Hells Angels, including Stadnick's Quebec Nomads chapter, constituted
a criminal organization; the only matter to be decided at trial in relation to the gangsterism offences
was Stadnick's involvement in crimes committed by his fellow Hells Angels.
81. Stadnick, ibid at paras 331-333, 340; Criminal Code, supra note 35 at ss 21(1)-(2).
82. Stadnick, ibid at paras 199-206, 318-319, 327-328, 334-342, 348.
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One of the challenges in Lindsay was to establish that the Ontario
Hells Angels constituted a criminal organization. Though there was plenty
of evidence as to the criminality of the Hells Angels in other Canadian
provinces, the Ontario chapters had been relatively quiet in the few
years since they were established. The Crown argued that it should be
able to rely on evidence of the criminality of Hells Angels from across
Canada because there was substantial evidence of communication and
collaboration between chapters and because the chapters shared a common
organizational structure. Justice Fuerst agreed: she characterized the
Ontario chapters as "an administrative subdivision of the larger entity" of
the national Hells Angels, and allowed the Crown to present evidence of
the Hells Angels' criminality from across Canada.83 There was substantial
evidence of communication and collaboration between the Hells Angels
across Canada. From the presence of Quebec Hells Angels at parties or
events hosted by chapters in other provinces, Stadnick's involvement in
assimilating clubs all across Canada while he was the national president
and a member of the Quebec Nomads chapter, to the Quebec Hells Angels'
significant interest in bringing Ontario's bikers into the fold. This evidence
was presented, considered, and used to establish the criminality of the
Hells Angels in Ontario by way of their shared structure and connections
to other national Hells Angels chapters."
The gang's internal hierarchy may also be used effectively through
non-criminal law measures. In 2010, the Registrar of the Alcohol and
Gaming Commission in Ontario [the Registrar] revoked a liquor licence
issued to a London, Ontario strip club called Famous Flesh Gordon's. The
establishment was owned by Robert Barletta, a full member and former
president of the London Hells Angels chapter." Ontario's Liquor Licence
Act [LLA] allows a licence to be revoked if "the past or present conduct of
the [person] ... affords reasonable grounds for the belief that the applicant
will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity
and honesty..."86 Despite the fact that Barletta had no criminal record,
and that there was no evidence of illegal activities occurring at Famous
Flesh Gordon's, the Registrar submitted an application to revoke the
establishment's licence based on Barletta's status in the Hells Angels.17
The Registrar argued that Barletta, as the former chapter president, was
83. Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 7, 942-943.
84. Ibid at paras 89-90, 1078-1079.
85. 751809 Ontario Inc v Ontario (Registrar, Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2014 ONSC 6707,
at paras 1-4, 8 [751809 Ontario Inc.].
86. Liquor Licence Act, RSO 1990 c L.19, s 6(2)(d).
87. 751809 Ontario Inc., supra note 85 at paras 5-8.
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"100% dedicated to the Hells Angels," and that not only would he have
been aware of the gang's criminal activities, but that he would have
ensured that his chapter received their "cut" of any criminal activities. In
their decision to revoke the liquor license, the Licence Appeal Tribunal
[the Tribunal] was clear: "the concern is not over the customers of this
establishment; it is about the licensee.""
On appeal, the Ontario Superior Court upheld the Tribunal's decision.
They pointed out that s. 6(2)(d) of the LLA requires more from an owner
than a clean criminal record: it requires that they actively work to carry
on business "in accordance with the law, and with integrity and honesty."
Taking aim at Barletta's position as former chapter president, the court
found that there was no way to overcome the fact that Barletta was:8 9
... a committed member of a notorious criminal organization whose
stature within that organization requires him to have a good criminal
network, to put the interests of the Hells Angels above all else, and to
refrain from cooperating with authorities or sharing information that
could harm the club.
The Court's decision to uphold the Tribunal's decision on the basis of
Barletta's status as a former chapter president is especially interesting. This
suggests that the state may be able to use an individual's status as a gang
executive as proof of their involvement with the gang's criminality even if
they no longer hold the position. This would allow the state to circumvent
the need to show evidence directly linking the accused to criminal activities,
and instead use their current or former executive position as proof of their
facilitation of, or association with, the commission of criminal offences.
Whether or not this decision has implications beyond liquor licencing, it is
a strong example of the state effectively using the Hells Angels' executive
structure against an individual member's business, if not against the
organization itself
2. Territoriality
Territoriality is a non-verbal communication that establishes a gang's use
and control of an area.9 0 For the Hells Angels, this means setting up and
maintaining chapters in a region so as to secure their territory against other
rival criminal organizations, and to secure their control over that region's
criminal activities. The Hells Angels' expansion across Canada and their
conflicts with other gangs can be adduced to their territoriality: they want
88. Ibid at paras 16-17.
89. Ibidatpara33.
90. Wolf, The Rebels, supra note 38 at 314.
State Reponses to Biker Gangs in Canada
to be the toughest and most powerful gang around, and they have an
economic interest in doing so through their control of criminal activities
that occur within their territory.9 1 The Hells Angels' territoriality formed
the crux of the Crown's gangsterism charge in Giles. They argued that
Giles was involved in the drug trafficking as part of his efforts to expand
the Hells Angels' presence into Kelowna, British Columbia, where Revell
and Rempel's drug trafficking operation was based, and that Giles acted
as an agent for the Hells Angels by controlling the drug operation to shore
up the Hells Angels' presence and power in the area.9 2 An intercept from
a gang meeting recorded Giles stating that he wanted to set up a chapter
in Kelowna that would be under the supervision of the Hells Angels'
Vancouver East End chapter. From their beachhead in Kelowna, the gang
would expand into the surrounding area under the supervision of the East
End chapter.9 3
The Crown also led evidence that showed that part of the Hells Angels'
territoriality generally involved using subordinates to do the "dirty work"
of criminal activities, thereby insulating higher-ranking members. The
Crown argued that Giles' arm's-length control over Revell was standard
procedure for the gang, and that Giles didn't have to be directly involved
in the trafficking operation: his involvement in the offence was met by
directing or supervising Revell's activities.9 4 However, the Crown had
failed to sufficiently prove that those elements arose in the specific matter,
and the gaps in their evidence were too great to be filled by contextual
or theoretical factors.9 5 Territoriality is a more general element of the
gang's structure: it describes how they generally behave all across Canada,
and even when it is supported by previous examples of the gang being
implicated in criminal activities because of their territoriality, it cannot
stand as proof of specific criminality. It is not enough to show how the
gang is known to operate, orto show past examples of the gang conforming
operational principles. Instead, the Crown must prove that the gang or its
members engaged in those actions in a specific instance.
3. Conclusion on administrative structures and gang hierarchy
The Hells Angels' power is based not only on their reputation for violence
and intimidation, but on their strict code of conduct and administrative
systems. All chapters across Canada adhere to the same rules and
91. Ibid at 337; Lindsay, supra note 13 at paras 273-279, 1032-1033.
92. Giles, supra note 54 at paras 132-135, 142.
93. Ibid at paras 215-216.
94. Ibid at paras 217-220.
95. Ibid at paras 225-230.
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regulations, which govern establishing a presence in a region either by
setting up a chapter or by supervising subordinates in their activities, and
controlling the area's criminal activities. It is possible that the state may
effectively use a gang's administrative structures and internal hierarchies
against them; unfortunately, the state's efforts have so far been met with
mixed results. The state has had some success, evidence of a gang's
national communications and collaborations and a shared administrative
structure means that the criminality of a specific region's chapters may be
established using evidence of the criminality of the Hells Angels across
Canada, rather than relying on specific evidence of criminality from that
particular region. Efforts to secure convictions based solely on the gang's
administrative structures and internal hierarchies, however, have not
met with success. Though Stadnick was convicted for several offences,
he was acquitted of those offences tied solely to his membership in the
Quebec Nomads chapter, despite evidence of that chapter's criminality
and his status within the chapter and the national organization. Similarly,
Giles was acquitted based on a lack of specific evidence tying him and
his membership in the Hells Angels to the criminal activities of Revell,
despite lots of evidence to the Hells Angels' territoriality and operational
principles.
Non-criminal law measures that utilize the gang's structures against
them have had some success: Barletta's liquor licence was successfully
revoked because ofhis membership and position in a criminal organization,
which was found to outweigh evidence that he had no criminal record
and that no criminal activities had taken place in his establishment. As
the procedural realm imposes a lower burden of proof, it may be the
most appropriate venue for the state to use a gang's organization and
administrative structures against it.
III. The clubhouse
A gang's clubhouse is a powerful and imposing public statement; it is
the brick and mortar representation of the power of the patch. From the
clubhouse's decoration and branding announcing the gang's presence
in an area, to serving as the venue for regular meetings, the clubhouse
functions in much the same way as a set of colours to establish the gang's
control and reputation in an area, and to intimidate others.9 6 Each chapter
is required to maintain a clubhouse that serves as their base of operations,
access to which is carefully monitored and restricted. Many clubhouses
include internal fortifications, video cameras, and other security features.
96. Lindsay, supra note 13 at para 561.
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Those who are admitted to the clubhouse are advised to keep quiet about
what they see: a sign in a seized Hells Angels clubhouse read "what you
hear here, what you see here, what you do here, stays here!"97
Clubhouses make gang members feel safe and powerful for several
reasons. The enhanced security measures and reinforcements allow
bikers to feel physically safe as they can be relatively certain that they are
safe from attacks from rival gang members or incursions by the police.
Clubhouses provide a highly secure environment away from the prying
eyes of the police or rival gang members, and provide a sense of "legal"
safety. Clubhouses also pander to bikers' egos, and serve as strong morale
boosters: they are testaments to the gang's total domination of a region,
to the point that they can (and often do) paint their clubhouses in their
gang's colours and adorn them with signs bearing the gang's name and
logo, secure in the knowledge that they are all but untouchable inside.
The question remains, are clubhouses actually as safe and powerful as
gang members would like to believe? Seizing, regulating, or otherwise
interfering with a gang's clubhouse could be a tremendous asset for the
state in their efforts to combat biker gangs. Gaining access to a clubhouse
poses a challenge, but if that hurdle is overcome then the state may be able
to use a gang's clubhouse against them, or take it away entirely.
1. The clubhouse and physical safety
One look at the Downtown Toronto Hells Angels' former clubhouse on
498 Eastern Avenue speaks volumes as to the structure's security: what
it lacked in aesthetic, it made up for in brute strength and utilitarian
intimidation. It was precisely the type of place that a group like the
Hells Angels would want to call home: undeniably eye-catching and
unquestionably intimidating. The sturdy image was much more than skin
deep: the clubhouse had a thick metal front door equipped with multiple
deadbolts, and there was a second steel door behind this one that could
slide across and block access. The front door was sheltered by a cement
structure that prevented direct line of sight to the door and blocked direct
access from the street to the door. There were cement posts along the front
of the structure to stop cars from ramming the front wall, and there were
no windows at street level. The building was also equipped with multiple
security cameras that covered the front door and the perimeter, and the
entire property was gated and surrounded with a fence. 98 It would not be
97. Ibid at paras 977-982.
98. R v Old Navy Property Corp, 2012 ONSC 6845 at para 69 [Old Navy Property Corp].
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an exaggeration to call the clubhouse a bunker; in fact, that may be an
understatement.
Given these extensive enhancements, gang members undoubtedly felt
secure within the building. Attacking this sense of physical safety may
prove to be a powerful tool in dismantling criminal organizations and may
be enacted at the municipal level. Many municipalities in Ontario have
passed by-laws prohibiting the "excessive" fortification of structures,
defined as anything more than "protection provided by commercially
marketed household security devices"9 9 and other reasonable security
measures. Examples of excessive fortification include electrified fencing,
bullet-proof shutters, and hidden traps. Collectively, these by-laws are
referred to as anti-bunker by-laws, for obvious reasons.10 0 The Hells
Angels challenged the constitutionality of an anti-bunker by-law enacted
by the Ontario municipality of Chatham-Kent. They argued that the by-law
violated the constitutional division of powers because it was a municipal
attempt to enact criminal law by targeting the gang's clubhouses while
allowing institutions such as banks to "excessively" fortify their structures.
The Court denied their application to quash the by-law on the basis that
it was designed to address the safety of emergency response personnel
who are overseen by municipalities and the province, such as firefighters
and paramedics, who may have to access the building. Following the
Court's decision, the Chatham-Kent by-law has become a guide for other
municipalities to enact anti-bunker by-laws to promote the safety of
residents and emergency services personnel.10 1
Anti-bunker by-laws maintain a legitimate non-criminal law goal-
public safety with respect to both the buildings' occupants and emergency
response personnel-that has the incidental effect of dismantling or at the
very least challenging a gang's symbol of power. There is no violation
of the division of powers because the by-law is not an attempt to enact
criminal law; there is no risk of unconstitutionality because the laws do
not offend individuals' freedom of association. The by-laws do not run the
risk of overbreadth or vagueness as they are sufficiently linked to specific
instances of fortification and the real risks to public safety that they pose.
At the same time, they make allowances for buildings that need to be
fortified for legitimate commercial purposes such as banks. If the bikers
99. Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 356; The Regional Municipality of York Police Services
Board, "Report of the Chief of Police: Municipal FortificationBy-law" (23 April 2008), online: <http://
archives.york.ca/councilcommitteearchives/pdf/may%/`20150%`20phillip%/`20fort.pdf> [Regional
Municipality, Municipal Fortification By-law].
100. Regional Municipality, Municipal Fortification By-law, ibid.
101. Ibid; Katz, Gangsterism, supra note 18 at 356.
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simply did not fortify their clubhouses, or brought their fortifications
within reasonable limitations, they would not be subject to the by-laws,
but they also may not feel as secure inside the clubhouses as a result. By
challenging the construction of a clubhouse, the state may challenge the
gang's sense of physical security.
2. The clubhouse and "legal safety"
It's not only a sense of physical safety that makes clubhouses appealing
to bikers: the advanced security systems, carefully monitored access, steel
door, and cinderblock walls ensure the police are kept out of the bikers'
dealings. This is what I refer to as "legal safety": a sense of freedom to
engage in, or discuss, criminal activities within the clubhouse, safe in the
knowledge that their offences cannot be detected by the police or rival
gang members. Hells Angels members let their guard down when they are
inside their clubhouses, and their relaxed attitude may provide the state
with ample opportunities to use the gang's clubhouse against it. Though
a rare occurrence, members of the Hells Angels have been known to turn
on their fellow gang members. Working as police agents, these individuals
have been able to secure incriminating evidence against the Hells Angels
while also exposing to the world how the bikers conduct themselves when
they think no one outside of the gang is looking. David Atwell was a
Canadian Hells Angels member who agreed to provide evidence against
the gang. Because he was a gang member and had unrestricted access
to the gang's inner workings, Atwell recorded numerous conversations
incriminating other Hells Angels. His evidence and testimony were
invaluable in convicting dozens of Hells Angels and their associates, and
also enabled the state to seize the gang's Downtown Toronto clubhouse.
Several members of the Downtown Toronto chapter were charged with
various trafficking offences, and with having committed those offences in
association with a criminal organization. At trial, they were all acquitted
of the gangsterism offences, but convicted of their drug offences. 10 2 Each
drug offence had some connection to the clubhouse. Three Toronto Hells
Angels-the chapter's president John Neal, vice-president Douglas Myles,
and chapter member Mehrdad Bahman-were convicted of trafficking
approximately 600 litres of gamma-Hydroxybutric acid. Though the
trafficking was not discussed at the clubhouse, members had to go to
the clubhouse to get directions to a secondary location where a meeting
discussing the operation was held. Neal and Bahman subsequently made
102. Edwards, "Hells Angels beat organized crime charges after marathon trial," supra note 62; Old
Navy Property Corp, supra note 98 at para 4.
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references to the trafficking at "church" meetings, which took place at the
clubhouse.10 3 Myles was also convicted of cocaine trafficking for his role
as a middle-man in a transaction between Atwell and another Downtown
Toronto chapter member, David Blackwood. Though the transaction
itself took place offsite, the specifics of the transaction were discussed
at the clubhouse.10 Chapter vice-president Larry Pooler was convicted
of trafficking oxycodone after selling Atwell 50 Percodan pills at the
clubhouse shortly before "church."o' Chapter member Lome Campbell
was convicted of conspiracy to traffic for giving Atwell permission to buy
a kilogram of cocaine from another Hells Angels member; the discussion
took place at the clubhouse after "church."1 0 6
Justice Forestell concluded that the clubhouse constituted offence-
related property in relation to these drug offences because the clubhouse
served as the hub for the accused's criminal activities:10 7
The connection between the participants in the relevant criminal
transactions was the Downtown Toronto [chapter]. The clubhouse
was the physical headquarters for the Downtown Toronto [chapter].
The clubhouse, as a meeting place for the participants, facilitated the
networking and discussions necessary to the trafficking activities. The
extent to which the clubhouse was used varied in each offence but the
clubhouse was "used in connection with the commission" of each of the
designated substance offences set out above [emphasis added].
The clubhouse connected the offenders through their membership in the
Hells Angels and played a role in the commission of each of the offences,
and it was forfeited to the Crown.10
Atwell's testimony and the evidence he provided in relation to the
transactions at the clubhouse helped the Crown seize the crown jewel
of the Hells Angels' Ontario operations. The fact that the president and
other chapter officers were involved in the trafficking offences suggests
that the gang's unwritten "rule" prohibiting criminal activities in the
clubhouse was really more of a suggestion. Indeed, Justice Forestell found
that the principle purpose of the "rule" was to prevent the detection of
criminal activities at the clubhouse to frustrate attempts at criminal or civil
forfeiture by the state, rather than to prevent the actual commission of
103. Old Navy Property Corp, supra note 98 at paras 22-31.
104. Ibid at paras 35-38.
105. Ibid at paras 32-34. It is unclear how many vice-presidents the chapter had at any given time, or
how Pooler and Myles' terms as vice-president may have overlapped.
106. Ibid at paras 39-43.
107. Ibid at paras 49-52.
108. Ibid at paras 53-57, 76.
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criminal activities.109 Gathering information from within the clubhouse
may be used to convict individual members, but may also be used to seize
the clubhouse itself, removing their physical infrastructure from a region
and thereby weakening the gang's position and status.
The forfeiture of the gang's clubhouse in Old Navy Property Corp was
a significant victory for the Crown, and a substantial blow to the bikers.
The loss of their clubhouse was undoubtedly a significant financial hit for
the chapter: the property had been appraised at $600,000 to $700,000 and
was ultimately sold by the Crown for $885,000.110 However, the loss of
the clubhouse was also a moral blow to the gang as it deprived them of a
longstanding home in the city. The Crown's victory in Old Navy Property
Corp eroded not only the bikers' sense of legal safety, but also their public
image and reputation.
3. The symbolism of the clubhouse
Aclubhouse is a loud, brash, unapologetic statementto a gang's presence in
an area. By adorning their clubhouses with symbols of their membership,
the Hells Angels use their clubhouses as silent challenges to enemies, be
they the state or a rival gang.' Clubhouses are valuable to the gang not
only because they provide members with spaces to relax and conduct
business, but also because they are public spectacles that reinforce the
gang's status and power in a region. Efforts to shut down a chapter by
prosecuting the members for their criminal offences may be successful,
but they will be more effective if they are combined with measures that go
after the gang's clubhouses.112 Clubhouse forfeiture applications suggest
that seizing a gang's clubhouse may be an effective way of dismantling
a gang's local operations, and successfully uses the gang's reliance upon
and faith in their clubhouse against them.
109. Ibid at para 70.
110. Ibid at para 3; Brennan Doherty, "Former Hells Angels clubhouse demolished," The Toronto
Star (21 February 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/02/2 1/former-hells-angels-
clubhouse-demolished.html>.
111. Because these structures have such a high visual impact, clubhouses can become focal points for
public awareness and attention such that they may take on a life of their own: a Hells Angels clubhouse
in Coquitlam, British Columbia, was accidentally listed as a meeting spot in the video game "Pokemon
GO," and the gang's Manhattan clubhouse has a 5 star rating on Yelp. Kim Bolan, "Hells Angels
clubhouse in Coquitlam a surprise Pokemon Go gym location," The Vancouver Sun (23 July 2016),
online: <http://vancouversuncom/news/local-news/hells-angels-clubhouse-in-coquitlam-a-surprise-
pokemon-go-gym-location>; "Hells Angels HQ New York" Yelp, online: <https://www.yelp.ca/biz/
hells-angels-hq-new-york-new-york>.
112. This is not to say that the combined effect of prosecution and clubhouse forfeiture will ensure
that a gang will leave town despite losing their clubhouse and a significant number of members,
the Hells Angels still claim to maintain at least two chapters in Toronto. Hells Angels East Toronto
website, supra note 74; Edwards, "Huge trend toward renting," supra note 74.
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4. Conclusion on the clubhouse
Rather than risk losing their clubhouses to criminal forfeiture, the Hells
Angels may be more inclined to rent properties rather than owning them
outright, and they have learned from their losses.1 1 3 This would decrease
the state's ability to seize property from the gang, as they would no
longer have a financial stake in their properties. While this decreases the
state's ability to seize the gang's assets and limits the state's ability to go
after gangs directly, even a rented clubhouse may still provide the state
with an avenue of targeting biker gangs and using their symbols against
them. The degree to which a gang feels physically or legally safe in their
rented clubhouses will likely depend on the extent to which they are able
to modify and fortify the premises, which would likely be governed by
tenancy laws and subsequent legal proceedings. Similarly, landlords may
be less willing to rent property to the Hells Angels if they run a higher
risk of losing that property through forfeiture proceedings, which could
frustrate the gang's ability to occupy property and may even contribute to
forcing the gang out of a region. This may mean that the state could pursue
biker gangs through the mechanism of tenancy law, such as the expansion
of anti-fortification by-laws or new provisions allowing property owners
to eject tenants or refuse tenancy to members of criminal organizations,
modeled on the success of municipal anti-fortification by-laws.
The state has used the Hells Angels' clubhouses against the gang in
several different proceedings, and all have been relatively successful. The
clubhouses may be subject to municipal by-laws prohibiting excessive
fortification, stripping the bikers of much of their sense of physical safety in
relation to the clubhouses. Such efforts have so far been largely successful,
although they are insufficient on their own to shut down a chapter. Instead,
they serve to augment other proceedings, and to attack the bikers' sense
of legal and physical safety in their clubhouses. The convictions of the
downtown Toronto chapter members demonstrate the benefit to the state
that may result from getting evidence from directly within the clubhouse.
It is no small irony that evidence gathered from within the clubhouse by
Hells Angels member and police agent David Atwell led to the clubhouse's
successful seizure. In doing so, the Crown successfully used the Hells
Angels' own faith in the legal safety of their clubhouse in prosecuting
Hells Angels members. Targeting clubhouses for criminal forfeiture also
strikes both a financial blow against the gang by removing a substantial
asset from their control, as well as a reputational blow by removing a
physical representation of a gang's presence from the region.
113. Edwards, "Huge trend toward renting," supra note 74.
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The clubhouse is undoubtedly a powerful tool for biker gangs, and as
a result it can also be an equally powerful tool for the state. The clubhouse
may be used by the state in support of criminal law proceedings, forfeiture
applications, and even municipal bylaw infractions. These elements have
their own impact on the gang's regional operations, but taken together they
may be sufficient to force a gang to shutter their chapter and leave town.
Though securing insider information and evidence is rare and challenging,
the quality and quantity of evidence such operations can produce makes
them invaluable. Similarly, forfeiture applications used in conjunction
with the prosecution of criminal offences require comparatively little
effort from the state and may produce substantial benefits. Using the Hells
Angels' clubhouses may be the most effective way that the state can use
the gang's assets against itself and its members.
Conclusion
Rather than merely penalizing individual members for their crimes
committed in association with a criminal organization, Canadian
lawmakers ought to target the organizations themselves, and turn their
own structures and symbols of power against gangs and their members.
The most effective state responses to organized crime will be those that
utilize our current laws, imperfect though they may be, in such a way as
to make the most effective and efficient use of a gang's own structures
and systems against the gang and its members. The degree to which an
individual invokes their membership in an organization, and the extent to
which that invocation of membership contributes to the commission of an
offence, may require extensive evidence and contextual factors. Provincial
and non-criminal law efforts to make use of the power of the patch have met
with limited success, and have been found in some instances to be entirely
unconstitutional. Despite an abundance of evidence as to the Hells Angels'
shared organizational structures and territoriality, evidence of their general
criminality is insufficient on its own to establish an individual's guilt in a
particular offence. This evidence may be used to enhance other evidence
or prosecutions, such as the court's decision in Lindsay to allow evidence
of the Hells Angels' criminality across Canada, rather than just the Ontario
chapters, based on the high degree of communication and collaboration
between chapters. Provincial liquor licensing regulations have made
effective use of the gang's well-documented administrative structure, as
the lower evidentiary burden in these proceedings was able to make more
effective use of evidence of the Hells Angels' general criminality.
Whereas criminal prosecutions using the power of the patch or the
gang's administrative structure may suffer from a lack of direct evidence
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tying the accused to the commission of offences, clubhouses may provide
the direct evidence needed. Evidence of criminality procured within
clubhouses may be of significant value to criminal prosecutions and
forfeiture applications because of the sense of legal safety these spaces
provide. They are frequently heavily modified and renovated to suit
bikers' particular needs, and as a result they are an effective target for
municipal by-laws. Because they are such public and visible symbols of a
gang's power and presence, losing a clubhouse may prove to be a powerful
blow against the gang's continued operations in a region. By seizing a
clubhouse, or forcing a gang to dismantle their special protections, the
state may strike directly at a gang's infrastructure, reduce a gang's visible
presence in a region, and possibly force the gang to shut down their
operations in that area altogether. It is no small irony that the clubhouse, a
symbol of a gang's power and prestige and the space where gang members
may feel safe from the outside world, may be its most vulnerable asset.
The state may effectively, efficiently, and successfully exploit the gang's
clubhouse against the gang in numerous ways and to numerous ends, and
efforts that make use of the clubhouse are the most effective methods of
targeting criminal organizations in Canada.
